Protectionism through exporting: subsidies with exportshare requirements in China by Defever, Fabrice & Riaño, Alejandro
  
ISSN 2042-2695 
 
 
 
CEP Discussion Paper No 1431 
May 2016 
Protectionism through Exporting: Subsidies with Export 
Share Requirements in China 
Fabrice Defever 
Alejandro Riaño 
 
 
    
Abstract 
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domestic firms than a standard unconditional export subsidy, albeit at a substantial welfare cost. 
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1 Introduction
China’s ascent to become the world’s largest exporter has been nothing short of spectacular, and has
naturally attracted considerable attention among economists and policymakers alike.1 Although
China’s strong reliance on subsidies to promote exports is well established, the fact that a large
number of these incentives are subject to export share requirements (ESR) — i.e. that they are
only available to firms that export more than a certain share of their output — has so far been
overlooked.2 Thus, our objective in this paper is to shed light on the effects of using subsidies with
ESR on a country’s exports, intensity of competition and welfare from a quantitative standpoint.
Understanding the implications of using this class of subsidies is of paramount importance for
two key reasons: first, trade policy instruments featuring ESR such as export processing zones and
duty drawback schemes are widely popular not only in China, but also across a large number of
developing countries.3 Second, we show that utilizing subsidies with ESR engenders large distor-
tions. These subsidies boost a country’s exports at the expense of sizable welfare losses. However,
unlike unconditional export subsidies, they decrease the level of competition, thereby increasing
protection for domestic firms there.
Subsidies with ESR encompass a wide range of fiscal instruments, including direct monetary
transfers, tax holidays and concessions, the provision of utilities at below-market rates, among
others. For instance, the 2004 Transitional Review Mechanism conducted by the World Trade
Organization (WTO) on subsidy practices in China noted that firms operating in several special
economic zones and exporting at least 50% of their production enjoyed tax deductions, access to
soft loans and priority access to infrastructure and land. The same document also stated that
firms exporting more than 70% of their output benefitted from local income tax exemptions and a
reduction in their corporate income tax rate.4 Another example pertains to the restriction faced by
1See e.g. Naughton (2007), Branstetter and Lardy (2008), Feenstra and Wei (2010), Rodrik (2010), Song et al.
(2011), Hanson (2012), World Bank (2013), among many others.
2Naughton (1996) and Feenstra (1998) are exceptions; they however, only offer anecdotal evidence documenting
the use of these subsidies in China.
3Table 2 lists twelve large countries (i.e. with population above 30 million) that offer subsidies with ESR according
to the U.S. State Department’s Investment Climate Statements. Additionally, 19 small developing countries were
required to eliminate incentive programmes subject to ESR by December 2015 in order to comply with disciplines
in the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures of the WTO (Creskoff and Walkenhorst, 2009; Waters,
2013; World Bank, 2014).
4Questions by the European Communities with regard to China’s Transitional Review Mechanism on Subsidies
and Countervailing Measures, September 30, 2003 (references G/SCM/Q2/CHN/5 and G/SCM/Q2/CHN/7).
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foreign firms until 2002, which forbade them to produce a wide range of consumer goods (e.g. digital
watches, bikes, washing machines and refrigerators) unless their exports accounted for more than
70% of their production. Similar restrictions have only been lifted in 2013 for the domestic sale of
video game consoles such as Nintendo’s Wii and Sony’s Playstation, which have been manufactured
in China for more than a decade.5
The large number of exporters in China that are eligible to benefit from subsidies with ESR
based on their export intensity is staggering. Figure 1 presents the distribution of export intensity
— the share of total sales accounted for by exports — for Chinese manufacturing exporters between
2000 and 2006. Half of all exporting firms in China export more than 70% of their output, and half
of these in turn, are ‘pure exporters’, i.e. firms selling all their output abroad.6 In contrast, Bernard
et al. (2003) and Eaton et al. (2011) report a negligible share of high-intensity exporters in the
U.S. and France respectively.7 It is important to note that none of the workhorse models of trade
with heterogenous firms such as Melitz (2003), Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) or Arkolakis (2010)
can easily reproduce the heavy right tail of the export intensity distribution displayed in Figure 1.
Figure 1 suggests that the availability of subsidies with ESR in China could affect substantially the
distribution of export intensity.
We investigate the consequences of subsidies with ESR in the context of a two-country model
of trade in which firms are heterogeneous in their productivity as in Melitz (2003), but also in
terms of firm-destination-specific demand shifters as in Eaton et al. (2011).8 Thus, in the absence
of subsidies, each exporter in our model has a unique optimal export intensity — what we call
‘natural’ export intensity — which is determined both by aggregate and idiosyncratic demand
shifters and transport costs. In contrast, in the workhorse Melitz (2003) model, all exporters would
have the same export intensity. Heterogeneity in firms’ demand across different markets is crucial
for our purposes because it accommodates a wide range of reasons why a firm would choose to export
the majority of its output in the absence of subsidies with ESR — e.g. producing a sophisticated
good that is not demanded locally, belonging to a global value chain, or having a well-developed
5See: http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/01/07/us-china-gamesconsoles-idUSBREA0606C20140107.
6The pervasiveness and distinct features of high-intensity exporters in China has also been studied by Lu (2010),
Dai et al. (2011) and Lu et al. (2014).
7More precisely, only 0.7% of U.S. exporters display an export intensity greater than 90%. Using data from the
Enquete Annuelle Entreprises, SESSI, for the year 2000, we find that the corresponding figure for France is 1.9%.
8Other models that feature firm-destination heterogeneity in demand are Crozet et al. (2012) and Cherkashin
et al. (2015).
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Figure 1: Export Intensity Distribution for Chinese Manufacturing Exporters, 2000-2006
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The figure depicts the kernel density of export intensity, defined as the share of exports in
total sales, for Chinese manufacturing firms reporting a positive value of exports. Data are
for the period 2000-2006 and are described in detail in Appendix A.
network of foreign customers, among many others. The magnitude of the distortions produced by
a given subsidy with ESR is fundamentally determined by the share of firms that are induced to
change their behavior when the policy is available; and this in turn is intimately connected to a
country’s natural distribution of export intensity.
We next allow one country to unilaterally offer subsidies (these can be based on firms’ sales
and/or fixed costs) subject to an ESR; that is, these are only available to firms with an export
intensity greater than or equal to a threshold η P p0, 1s. For firms with a natural export intensity
above η, the subsidy with ESR works in the same way as an unconditional subsidy; since these
high-intensity exporters already satisfy the requirement, they do not need to alter their behavior
to enjoy the incentives. Conversely, firms that do not fulfill the ESR need to weight the financial
windfall provided by the subsidies against the profit loss associated with distorting their optimal
export intensity. We identify two types of ‘constrained exporters’, i.e. firms that either change the
prices they charge or the markets they serve to gain access to subsidies, namely, regular and pure
constrained exporters. The former sell both domestically and abroad, and set prices so as to achieve
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an export intensity exactly equal to the ESR threshold, while pure constrained exporters choose
instead to only export in order to satisfy the export requirement by saving on domestic fixed costs.
Two key results emerge from our model. Firstly, the introduction of a subsidy with a single
ESR strictly below 1 generates both pure and regular constrained exporters simultaneously —
that is, the mass of firms with an export intensity equal to the ESR and 1 both rise vis-a`-vis the
laissez-faire equilibrium. Given that the available incentives in China feature several different ESR
thresholds, ranging from 50 to 100%, our model is consistent with an export intensity distribution
that displays a majority of pure exporters. Secondly, we show that although regular and pure
constrained exporters follow different pricing strategies in response to subsidies, these ultimately
lower the level of competition in the country enacting the policy, increasing the protection of the
least profitable firms. More precisely, regular constrained exporters increase domestic prices and
lower export prices so that their export intensity exactly reaches the ESR threshold. Constrained
pure exporters, on the other hand, do not distort their export price (over and above the direct
reduction in the price due to the sales subsidy), but eliminate their variety altogether from the
domestic consumption basket. Under monopolistic competition both these responses increase the
domestic price index, since this variable is increasing on the average price charged by firms and
decreasing in the number of varieties available for consumption. In contrast, an unconditional
export subsidy lowers the price index in the country providing subsidies. This happens both
because average prices fall — as the least profitable domestic firms exit the market in response to
the expansion of local exporters — and because of tougher import competition, which occurs as
trade partners increase their exports to achieve balanced trade (Demidova and Rodr´ıguez-Clare,
2009; Felbermayr et al., 2012).
In order to assess the general equilibrium consequences of utilizing subsidies with ESR in our
model, we investigate the effect of one country offering an 8.7% ad-valorem export sales subsidy
subject to a 70% ESR. We choose this specific policy experiment because the magnitude of the
export subsidy is broadly equivalent to one of the best documented fiscal incentives subject to an
ESR in China, the corporate income tax rate discount — from 30 to 10% — offered to foreign-
invested enterprises and Chinese-owned firms located in free trade zones with an export intensity of
at least 70% in place between 1991 and 2008. Since China imposes ESR on a wide range of policy
instruments (which we describe in great detail in Section 2), and since there is extremely limited
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systematic data on the size and scope of subsidies offered to exporters in China (Lardy, 1992;
Claro, 2006; Girma et al., 2009; Haley and Haley, 2013), carrying out a comprehensive quantitative
evaluation of all subsidies with ESR available in China is beyond the scope of our paper.9 We
instead shed light on how subsidies with ESR operate, by comparing them with the laissez-faire
equilibrium and with an equivalent unconditional subsidy on export sales in terms of the behavior
of price indices (a measure of the intensity of competition), the distribution of export intensity, the
probability of firms’ exit and welfare.
We calibrate our model’s parameters to reflect the share of exporters and the distribution of
export intensity in a hypothetical developing country that does not provide subsidies with ESR,
with the view to approximate a counterfactual scenario in which China does not offer this type of
subsidies. We construct this undistorted distribution of export intensity by combining information
on the use of subsidies with ESR gathered from the U.S. State Department’s Investment Climate
Statements and cross-country firm-level data on firms’ export intensity from the World Bank’s
Enterprise Surveys over the period 2002-2012. As a robustness check, we also use the export
intensity distribution observed in China in 2013, when the corporate income tax deduction subject
to ESR had been phased out.
Our quantitative exercise reveals that given our conjectured natural export intensity distribu-
tion, introducing a subsidy with ESR with the characteristics defined above (which amounts to a
total expenditure in subsidies of 0.19% of GDP in our model) explains 43% of the share of exporters
with an export intensity above 70% observed in China between 2000 and 2006, with approximately
two thirds of the increase in high-intensity exporters accounted for by pure exporters.
Subsidies with ESR produce a substantially greater boost to aggregate exports in the enacting
country than the equivalent unconditional export subsidy (the exports/GDP ratio increases by 6.3%
with the former compared to 2.3% with the latter). At the same time, the intensity of competition
and the probability of firms’ exiting the market are further reduced when subsidies are subject to
export requirements. The combination of these effects implies that the use of subsidies with ESR
can be characterized as ‘protectionism through exporting’. Of course, it follows that such a strategy
9For instance, China did not provide the required subsidy rates or annual amount budgeted for export-related
subsidies in either of their notifications to the WTO Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures in 2006
and 2011. The notifications were also silent about the extent of subsidies provided at the provincial and local level.
See “Request from the United States to China,” October 11, 2011, reference G/SCM/Q2/CHN/42.
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comes at a hefty cost in terms of efficiency; imposing an ESR constraint can induce firms to distort
their prices or the number of markets they operate in. While both types of export subsidy reduce
welfare in the enacting country, the subsidy with ESR that we investigate in our policy experiment
lowers real income by 0.83% instead of 0.1% when no requirements are imposed.
A strong reliance on encouraging exports while at the same time protecting the domestic market
has been a key objective of the Chinese Communist Party along China’s transition towards a mar-
ket economy (Rodrik, 2014). This dual trade policy regime in which a system of export-oriented
enclaves coexists with a highly protected domestic economy has been aptly described by Feenstra
(1998) as ‘one country, two systems’. Although the rationale motivating the initial implementation
of subsidies with ESR has long subsided, China’s regionally-decentralized governance has enabled
their long-lasting permanence. Because of their positive effect on exports and domestic profitabil-
ity, the use of these subsidies is closely aligned with the objectives of local officials who enjoy a
considerable degree of autonomy and for whom career progression is tied to the aforementioned
indicators of economic performance (Branstetter and Feenstra, 2002; Xu, 2011). Additionally, be-
cause subsidies with ESR hinder the market selection effects of trade liberalization, they can be
rationalized as an instrument aimed at achieving a ‘reform without losers’ (Lau et al., 2000).
Related Work. Despite their widespread use, the existing literature on subsidies with ESR is
rather sparse, with no quantitative work available. Export share requirements have previously
been studied as a second-best policy instrument by Davidson et al. (1985) and Rodrik (1987).
We depart from this earlier theoretical literature in two key respects. Firstly, our heterogeneous-
firm model allows us to investigate the endogenous choice of firms to operate facing an export
requirement, while both Davidson et al. and Rodrik assume that ESR are exogenously imposed on
a subset of firms. Secondly, our quantitative model sheds light on the magnitude of the distortions
engendered by the imposition of export requirements relative to equivalent unconditional export
subsidies.
Our paper adds to several strands of literature. It contributes to the growing body of research
that quantifies the welfare and productivity effects of China’s “unorthodox” trade and investment
policies (Bajona and Chu, 2010; Khandelwal et al., 2014; Holmes et al., Forthcoming). Our analysis
of subsidies with ESR is also related to the literature studying trade policy in models with heteroge-
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neous firms (Chor, 2009; Demidova and Rodr´ıguez-Clare, 2009; Davies and Eckel, 2010; Felbermayr
et al., 2012; Cherkashin et al., 2015; Costinot et al., 2015), as well as to the body of work investi-
gating the welfare implications of free trade zones and trade-related investment measures (TRIMs)
(Hamada, 1974; Miyagiwa, 1986; Chao and Yu, 2014; Yu¨cer and Siroe¨n, forthcoming).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of fiscal incentives
featuring export share requirements in China. Section 3 presents our quantitative general equilib-
rium model, and Section 4 spells out our strategy to calibrate the model’s parameters. Section 5
presents the results of our counterfactual experiments. Section 6 concludes.
2 Subsidies with Export Share Requirements in China
In this section we provide a concise overview of policy measures available in China between 2000
and 2006 featuring incentives available to firms conditional on their export intensity exceeding a
stated threshold.
These subsidies were a key innovation introduced in the first wave of opening-up reforms
launched in 1979. Their objective was to facilitate China’s interaction with the rest of the world
without disrupting its socialist economy.10 Despite clearly outgrowing their original purpose, sub-
sidies with ESR have remained ubiquitous in China, even after it joined the WTO in 2001. They
target three types of firms primarily: Chinese-owned firms located in Free Trade Zones (FTZ),
foreign-invested enterprises (FIE) and establishments devoted to export processing activities (PTE).
The online Appendix provides a detailed description of the laws and regulations discussed below. It
is important to note that Free Trade Zones and duty drawback schemes such as China’s processing
trade regime are permitted under WTO agreements. However, if a policy measure is conditioned
on export performance (e.g. setting minimum export targets for firms) such as in the examples
provided below, it would then violate Article 3 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing
Measures (ASCM) and the Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs) Agreement.11
Figure 2 decomposes the export intensity distribution according to whether exporters belong or
10This policy objective was explicitly mentioned in the ideological justification for the establishment of the first
special economic zones in Guangdong and Fujian. Borrowing from ideas first developed by Lenin, it was argued that
a communist country could not exist without having ties with the rest of the world. This exchange however, had to
operate based on capitalist relations, at least in its early stages (Chan et al., 1986).
11We thank Petros Mavroidis and Luca Rubini for clarifying this point from a legal perspective.
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not to one of the three types of firms for which subsidies with ESR are more likely to be available.
The contrast between the two groups is again striking. The vast majority of high intensity exporters
are eligible — based on their mode of operation — to benefit from these subsidies; low-intensity
exporters, on the other hand, are more likely to be Chinese-owned firms operating outside a FTZ
and not exporting through the processing regime. See Appendix A for further details.
Figure 2: Export Intensity Distribution according to Eligibility to Receive Subsidies with ESR
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The figure depicts the kernel density of export intensity, defined as the share of exports in
total sales, for Chinese manufacturing firms reporting a positive value of exports. Data are
for the period 2000-2006 and are described in detail in Appendix A.
Free Trade Zones. Free Trade Zones are export-oriented enclaves designed to attract both foreign
and domestic investors by providing tax concessions, streamlined regulations, duty-free imports of
materials and equipment used for exporting, among other allowances. For the purposes of the
paper, FTZs include Special Economic Zones, Coastal Development Zones, the Yangtze and Pearl
River Delta Economic Zones as well as smaller industrial parks such as Economic and Technolog-
ical Development Zones, High-Technology Industrial Development Zones and Export Processing
Zones. FTZs vary tremendously in terms of their size, ranging from small enclosed areas to entire
prefecture-cities. Appendix B provides the complete list of prefecture-cities considered.
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A crucial objective ascribed to FTZs is to be ‘laboratories’ to test market-oriented policies before
their potential implementation in the rest of the economy (Wang, 2013). The Chinese government
initially designated four counties in Guangdong and Fujian provinces as Special Economic Zones in
1979 as one of the components of Deng Xiaoping’s package of economic reforms aimed at reintegrat-
ing China into the world economy. The following two decades witnessed the establishment of a large
number of FTZs in cities located primarily along the coastal regions (see Figure B.1 in Appendix
B), where a vast majority of China’s export-oriented industrial production is concentrated.
China’s corporate income tax regime provides a prime example of the type of incentives available
to firms operating in FTZs which are conditioned on ESR. The statutory corporate income tax rate
prevailing in China between 1991 and 2008 was 30%.12 Chinese-owned firms could reduce their tax
rate to 10% if they were located in an FTZ and exported more than 70% of their output. As a
result of several complaints by the European Union, U.S. and Canada at the WTO, China modified
its corporate income tax legislation substantially in January 2008. Under the new law, a corporate
tax rate of 25% applies both to domestic and foreign companies, and incentives conditioned on ESR
have been scrapped. A five-year transition period was established so that the new tax law became
fully operational in 2013.
Provincial and local managers of FTZs compete fiercely with each other, particularly in seeking
to attract FIEs, and therefore offer a wide array of additional incentives linked to export perfor-
mance such as tax deductions, access to soft loans and priority access to infrastructure and land.
For instance, Standard Chartered Bank (2007) reports that the city of Shenzhen, China’s first spe-
cial economic zone with a total area of 493 km2, offers firms that have paid all their value-added
taxes on inputs and that export the entirety of their production, a 5% sales cash subsidy. The
Shenzhen Special Economic Zone also halves the land use fee charged on certified ‘enterprises-for-
export’. Similarly, most Export Processing Zones specify strict requirements for firms’ domestic
sales allowance – usually 30% of the total volume of sales. The first 15 pilots of this new type
of zone were set up in 2000, and their number has more than tripled over the last decade. Chi-
nese provincial and local governments seem keen to continue experimenting with new strategies to
develop geographically-enclosed areas in which high export intensity firms are encouraged to locate.
12Corporate Income Tax Law of the People’s Republic of China, 16 September 1991, Article 5.
9
Foreign Invested Enterprises. The ‘Twenty-two regulations’, established in 1986 with the
objective of attracting foreign investment, defined an ‘export-oriented’ firm as a manufacturing
enterprise whose export volume accounts for 50% or above of its annual sales.13 FIEs exceeding
this threshold benefitted from preferential land-use policies, easier access to finance and exemptions
from industrial and commercial consolidated tax. Until 2001, being an export-oriented firm was
a requirement for foreign investments in China and FIEs had to specify their share of domestic
sales by contract.14 Firms that did not comply with this requirement faced steep penalties; for
instance, FIEs that did not meet the targets set for export-oriented enterprises within three years
from the day they began production, were required to repay 60% of the tax refunded.15 After
China’s accession to the WTO, the law on Foreign Capital Enterprises revised in October 2000,
lifted the requirement for FIEs to export the majority of their production. Nevertheless, financial
incentives conditional on export intensity have remained in place after 2001.
The first paragraph of the 1991 corporate income tax law stated that “The establishment of
enterprises with foreign investment which export all or the greater part of their production should
be encouraged.”16 Similarly to Chinese-owned firms, FIEs that export more than 70% of their
output lower their corporate income tax rate from 30 to 10%. However, unlike domestically-owned
firms, FIEs are not restricted to be located in FTZ to enjoy this incentive.17
The 1995 regulations entitled “Guiding the Direction of Foreign Investment” also featured
restrictions on local sales for FIEs. According to this law, all foreign investment projects were
classified in one of four categories: encouraged, permitted, restricted and prohibited. However,
restricted projects that exported at least 70% of their total sales were automatically considered
as permitted.18 This regulation is still in place today, despite China substantially revising the list
of restricted products after joining the WTO. The 2002 regulation has introduced a new project
category named “all-for export projects”, which includes any project exporting all its production.
Such projects are treated as encouraged projects automatically and therefore enjoy preferential
13Enforcement of the Provisions of the State Council on Encouraging Foreign Investment, January 1, 1987.
14Circular of the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation on Submission of Import and Export Plans
for Enterprises with Foreign Investment, October 25, 2000.
15Corporate Income Tax Law of the People’s Republic of China, 30 June 1991, Article 8.4.4.
16Corporate Income Tax Law of the People’s Republic of China’, 9 April 1991, Basic Regulations. 8.1.
17‘Corporate Income Tax Law of the People’s Republic of China’, 30 June 1991, Article 8.3.5.
18Regulations for Guiding the Direction of Foreign Investment, June 7, 1995, Article 11.
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treatment,19 e.g. all-for export projects are entitled to a 20% refund of import duty and import
value-added tax.20
The generous tax concessions available to FIEs has driven local Chinese entrepreneurs to en-
gage in what is known as “round-tripping” — i.e. setting up shell companies in Hong Kong, Macau
and Taiwan (HMT), which produce and export goods from China, thereby enjoying tax breaks
— in a massive scale (Prasad and Wei, 2007). HMT-based foreign-invested firms account for ap-
proximately half of all FIEs and more than half of Processing Trade Enterprises operating in China.
Processing Trade Enterprises. China established the legal framework for processing trade in
1979, thus allowing the duty-free importation of inputs and components needed for the production
of goods for export (Naughton, 1996; Fernandes and Tang, 2012). Since the early 1990s, assembling
and processing has consistently accounted for approximately half of China’s export volume. From
a legal standpoint, Processing Trade Enterprises (PTEs) are production enterprises or factories
established by business enterprises but with independent accounting and their own business licence.
Enterprises engaged in processing are required to obtain a production capability certification
as well as a processing trade approval certificate granted by government authorities; they also face
strict controls over their domestic sales. These enterprises are allowed to import inputs duty-free as
long as they are not used for domestic consumption; if any output is sold in the domestic market,
firms must promptly pay the tariffs and VAT on the imported materials. More importantly, they
must obtain approval from both the provincial commerce authorities and customs for an import
licence; failing to do so translates into a penalty ranging from 30 to 100% of the declared value of
the imported materials and parts.21 In practice, firms engaged in export processing either become
fully export-oriented or are forced to set up segregated production facilities to sell domestically
in order to reduce the leakage of tariff-free intermediate goods (Hong Kong Trade Development
Council, 2009; Brandt and Morrow, 2013).
In order to enjoy autonomy regarding domestic sales, a processing trade enterprise has to
19Regulations for Guiding the Direction of Foreign Investment, February 11, 2002.
20General Administration of Customs and State Administration of Taxation, 4 September 2002.
21Hong Kong Trade Development Council (2003), Guide to Doing Business in China, Chapter on Processing-Trade.
Based on the circular concerning issuance of “Interim Measures on Administration of the Examination and Approval
of Processing Trade” and “Interim Measures on Administration of the Examination and Approval of Domestic Sale of
Bonded Materials and Parts Imported for Processing Trade”, Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation
(1999, WJMGF. No. 314 and No. 315).
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change its registration and become a FIE, which requires it to temporarily stop its production
for a customs auditing. The consulting company Li & Fung Group (2012) estimates that this
production disruption takes approximately 9 to 12 months. Furthermore, the transformation from
PTE to FIE involves the work of more than 10 government departments and can potentially result
in a substantial tax repayment.
PTEs can also import equipment provided by a foreign client to be used in processing duty-free.
To obtain this benefit, the PTE has to be an independent factory devoted to export processing,
which in turn requires it to export all its production. If the PTE does not count with a processing-
oriented facility, it needs to specify in the terms of their processing trade contract that at least 70%
of its output must be exported.
3 Model
Preferences. Consider a world with two countries, Home (H) and Foreign (F ). Each country
i P tH,F u, is inhabited by Li identical consumers who supply one unit of labor inelastically. The
representative consumer in each country has Dixit-Stiglitz preferences with elasticity of substitution
σ ą 1. Utility in country i is given by:
Ui “
«ÿ
j
˜ż
ωPΩji
rzjipωq 1σ´1 qjipωqsσ´1σ dω
¸ff σ
σ´1
, i, j P tH,F u, (1)
where Ωji is the set of varieties produced in country j which are available to consumers in country
i, qjipωq is the quantity of good ω consumed and zjipωq is a demand shifter for variety ω, with a
higher value of zpωq corresponding to higher demand for good ω.
Eaton et al. (2011) show that firm-destination heterogeneity in demand is necessary to reconcile
the observed variation in firms’ export sales relative to domestic sales with the Melitz (2003) model;
along the same lines, Munch and Nguyen (2014) find that firm-destination effects explain half of the
variation in export sales across narrowly defined product-destination markets using Danish data.22
In addition to cross-country variation in the taste for a specific variety, Crozet et al. (2012) argue
22Cherkashin et al. (2015) develop a similar model to ours to assess the effect of preferential access granted to
Bangladeshi exporters to the U.S. and EU markets. Like ours, their model features differences across firms in terms
of their productivity and firm-destination-specific demand shifters. Unlike their model, ours investigates the general
equilibrium consequences of trade policy.
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that these demand shifters can also represent a firm’s network of connections with purchasers in
each market. This dimension is particularly important for affiliates of multinational corporations
and firms producing goods specifically customized to individual clients within a global value chain.
These preferences yield the following iso-elastic demand function in country i for variety ω
produced in j:
qjipωq “ Ajipωqpjipωq´σ, with Ajipωq ” EiP σ´1i zjipωq, (2)
where Ei denotes aggregate expenditure in country i, and Pi, the ideal price index in country i, is
defined as:
Pi “
«ÿ
j
˜ż
ωPΩij
zjipωqpjipωq1´σdω
¸ff 1
1´σ
, i, j P tH,F u. (3)
Production. Firms in country i incur an initial investment fei to learn their idiosyncratic produc-
tivity, ϕ, and demand shifters pzii, zijq.23 We assume that domestic and export demand shifters are
drawn from the same distribution, Fz and are independent from each other. Productivity is drawn
from a distribution Fϕ, and is also assumed to be independent of demand shifters. With a slight
abuse of notation, let ω ” pϕ, zii, zijq denote a firm’s state vector. Based on their knowledge about
ω, firms first choose whether to stay in or exit the market. If a firm decides to operate, it produces
using a linear technology with labor as the sole input, q “ ϕl; thus, the marginal cost for a firm
with productivity ϕ located in country i is wi{ϕ, where wi is the wage prevailing in that country.
We assume that firms face a location-specific fixed cost to sell their output in each country
(Eaton et al., 2011) — e.g. a Home-based firm pays fHH when selling domestically and fHF when
it exports to Foreign.24 Moreover, exporters from country i selling in market j incur a transport cost
τij ě 1 on their export sales, whereas there are no transport costs involved in selling domestically,
i.e. τii “ 1, i, j P tH,F u. The combination of location-specific fixed costs with firm-destination-
specific demand shifters means that in the absence of subsidies with ESR there will be three types
of firms operating in equilibrium: firms that sell only domestically (indexed by d), ‘pure’ exporters,
i.e. producers that export all their output (indexed by x), and ‘regular’ exporters, selling their
output both domestically and abroad (indexed by dx).
Heterogeneity in terms of productivity and demand shifters also implies that firms’ choice
23All fixed costs in the model are denominated in units of labor.
24Notice that our assumption of location-specific fixed costs implies that these incorporate both production and
“market access” costs.
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regarding which markets to operate in is not fully characterized by a set of productivity cutoffs
as in the standard Melitz (2003) model. For instance, highly productive firms that experience low
demand draws abroad may not find profitable to export, while the converse can also happen —
some exporters will be less productive than domestic firms. Nevertheless, since regular exporters
face the highest fixed cost (fii ` fij), they are, on average, the most productive type of firm.
As it is well known, all firms set optimal prices that feature a constant mark-up above marginal
cost, which is augmented by the transport cost when a firm exports. Letting k P td, x, dxu index
firms’ mode of operation, profits for firm ω, located in country i and using production mode k, are
given by:
piki pωq “
ÿ
j
«
κτ1´σij Aijpωq
ˆ
ϕ
wi
˙σ´1
´ wifij
ff
¨ 1ijpωq, i, j P tH,F u, (4)
where κ ” pσ ´ 1qσ´1σ´σ and 1ijpωq is an indicator function taking the value 1 when firm ω in
country i sells some of its output in market j and zero otherwise.
Conditional on a firm selling a positive quantity abroad, we define an exporter’s ‘natural’ export
intensity, ηki pωq, as the share of its total sales accounted for by exports in the absence of subsidies:
ηki pωq “
$’’&’’%
τ1´σij Aijpωq
Aiipωq`τ1´σij Aijpωq
if k “ dx
1 if k “ x.
(5)
Notice that although a firm’s natural export intensity is independent of its productivity — since the
elasticity of demand and markups in each market are constant — it varies across regular exporters
due to firm-destination-specific demand shifters. Without the latter, not only all regular exporters
would sell the same share of their revenue abroad, but pure exporters would not be able to coexist
alongside domestic firms and regular exporters in equilibrium.
The fact that our model delivers a non-degenerate distribution of firms’ natural export intensity
is critical for our objective of assessing the consequences of subsidies with ESR. Firms choose to
export the majority of their output for a wide variety of reasons besides the availability of subsidies
conditioned on ESR. For instance, they could produce goods for which there is little domestic de-
mand (what Dı´az de Astarloa et al. (2013) call “orphan industries”, e.g. woolen sweater producers
in Bangladesh), or they might operate as links in a global value chain, assembling components into
a new product that is exported in order to continue in the following stage of production. Such
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naturally-occurring high-intensity exporters certainly benefit from the availability of subsidies with
ESR in our model, but as will become clear below, do not need to distort their behavior to receive
these subsidies.
Subsidies with Export Share Requirements. We now introduce a set of subsidies featuring an
export share requirement (ESR) at Home. Exporters with an export intensity of at least η P p0, 1s,
receive an ad-valorem subsidy sr on their total sales and/or a subsidy sf on their total fixed cost
bill. It is important to note that several of the incentives conditioned on an ESR summarized in
Section 2 involve tax deductions rather than direct cash outlays. Following Bauer et al. (2014), it
is straightforward to show that a sales subsidy for firms operating subject to an ESR is equivalent
to a reduction in the corporate income tax rate on their gross profit (i.e. before incurring fixed
costs).25
Let us now consider the profit maximization problem of a regular exporter at Home facing a
vector of subsidies psr, sf q subject to an ESR with export intensity threshold η:
max
pηHH ,p
η
HF
#
p1`srq
“
AHHpωqppηHHq1´σ `AHF pωqppηHF q1´σ
‰´ˆwH
ϕ
˙“
AHHpωqppηHHq´σ ` τHFAHF pωqppηHF q´σ
‰
´ p1´ sf qpfHH ` fHF qwH
+
subject to:
AHF pωqppηHF q1´σ
AHHpωqppηHHq1´σ `AHF pωqppηHF q1´σ
ě η. (6)
Using the first-order necessary conditions to solve problem (6), we can readily establish that,
Lemma 1 If ηdxH pωq ă η, then the ESR constraint is binding.
Proof. See Appendix C.
In other words, a regular exporter with natural export intensity below the ESR threshold seeking
to receive these subsidies, would choose its domestic and export prices so that its export intensity
is exactly equal to η. We can now use Lemma 1 to solve problem (6), and characterize the optimal
prices charged by exporters benefiting from subsidies with ESR. The solution involves two cases.
First, consider a firm for which ηdxH pωq ă η — that is, a firm which finds the ESR constraint binding.
25If the corporate income tax was levied on net profits (including fixed costs), then a tax deduction subject to an
export requirement would be equivalent to a combination of a sales subsidy and a fixed cost tax for firms operating
subject to an ESR. We discuss this in more detail in Section 5.
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In order to reach the export intensity threshold, this firm sets prices
pηHHpωq “
«
p1´ ηq σσ´1AHF pωq 1σ´1 ` η σσ´1 τHFAHHpωq 1σ´1
p1´ ηq 1σ´1AHF pωq 1σ´1
ff
1
1` sr
σ
σ ´ 1
ˆ
wH
ϕ
˙
, (7)
pηHF pωq “
«
p1´ ηq σσ´1AHF pωq 1σ´1 ` η σσ´1 τHFAHHpωq 1σ´1
η
1
σ´1AHHpωq 1σ´1
ff
1
1` sr
σ
σ ´ 1
ˆ
wH
ϕ
˙
, (8)
which result in profits:
piηHpω; sr, sf , ηq “ κp1` srqσΘpAHHpωq, AHF pωq, η, τq
ˆ
ϕ
wH
˙σ´1
´ p1´ sf qpfHH ` fHF qwH , (9)
where Θ, which is a profit-shifter term, is given by:
Θ ” AHHpωqAHF pωq”
p1´ ηq σσ´1AHF pωq 1σ´1 ` η σσ´1 τHFAHHpωq 1σ´1
ıσ´1 . (10)
Appendix D shows that Θ is a concave function of η, reaching a global maximum at a firm’s
natural export intensity η “ ηdxH pωq, with ΘpηdxH q “ AHH`τ1´σHF AHF . Notice that this result implies
that firms with natural export intensity of at least η — the second case characterizing the solution
of (6) — will choose to maintain their natural export intensity, since Θ
`
ηdxH pωq
˘ ě Θpηq. Appendix
E shows that optimal prices and profits only need to be modified marginally if the ad-valorem sales
subsidy sr is granted based on firms’ export sales instead of total sales. We will investigate the
effect of imposing an ESR on export sales subsidies in order to facilitate the comparison with a
standard, unconditional export subsidy in Section 5.
Figure 3 illustrates the consequences of imposing an export share requirement on firms’ prof-
itability, by plotting the profit-shifter term Θ as a function of the ESR threshold, η, for three,
equally profitable regular exporters that differ only in their natural export intensity. The first
thing to notice is that in the absence of subsidies, only firms with a natural export intensity greater
than or equal to the ESR threshold would choose to operate facing an export share requirement.
Secondly, for a given set of subsidies, firms with higher natural export intensity are more likely
to change their prices to receive the subsidies than firms that sell the majority of their output
domestically. This can be clearly seen in Figure 3, by noticing that for a given ESR (70% for
instance), the value of the profit shifter term Θ is higher for the firm with natural export intensity
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of 0.5 than for the firm with a lower natural export intensity. Lastly, Figure 3 shows that firms
with natural export intensity above the ESR threshold would not find it profitable to change their
export intensity when subsidies are introduced.
Figure 3: Profit-Shifter Θ and Export Share Requirement
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Firm Types when Subsidies with ESR are available. Once subsidies with ESR are offered,
we can now identify six types of firms operating in the country enacting the subsidies:
1. Domestic firms (k “ d). These firms do not receive subsidies by definition. Their profits are
still given by equation p4q.
2. Ineligible Regular exporters (k “ dxn), i.e. firms selling both domestically and abroad which
are not eligible to receive subsidies with ESR. The natural export intensity for these firms
is below the ESR threshold ηdxH pωq ă η, and given the prevailing subsidies, they do not find
profitable to distort their prices to satisfy the export requirement, i.e. pidxH pωq ě piηHpωq.
Their profit is also given by equation p4q.
3. Unconstrained regular exporters (k “ dxu), i.e. firms selling domestically and abroad with a
natural export intensity above the ESR threshold, ηdxuH pωq P pη, 1q. These firms set the usual
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constant markup above marginal cost under laissez-faire but lower their prices in proportion
to the magnitude of the subsidy on sales, sr. They set domestic and export prices p
dxu
HH “
1
1`sr
σ
σ´1
wH
ϕ and p
dxu
HF “ τHF pdxuHH respectively, and realize profits:
pidxuH pω; sr, sf , ηq “ κp1` srqσrAHHpωq` τ1´σHF AHF pωqs
ˆ
ϕ
wH
˙σ´1
´p1´ sf qpfHH ` fHF qwH .
(11)
They maintain their natural export intensity after the introduction of the subsidies.
4. Pure exporters (k “ xu) that would only serve the export market even in the absence of
subsidies. These firms export all their output and therefore meet the export share requirement
by definition. Subsidies with ESR are equivalent to unconditional subsidies for them. It is
straightforward to show that pure exporters lower their export prices, pxuHF “ 11`sr σσ´1 τHFwHϕ
in response to the sales subsidy, and achieve profits
pixuH pωq “ κp1` srqστ1´σHF AHF pωq
ˆ
ϕ
wH
˙σ´1
´ p1´ sf qfHFwH , (12)
which are higher than in the absence of subsidies with ESR.
5. Constrained regular exporters (k “ dxc). These firms, which would have a natural export
intensity below the ESR under laissez-faire, choose to sell domestically and abroad and set
prices in order to achieve an export intensity exactly equal to η. For these firms, the gain due
to the subsidies exceeds the profit loss produced by the distortion of their prices.
6. Constrained pure exporters (k “ xc). These firms would not have chosen to operate as pure
exporters had the subsidies with ESR not being in place. These firms set the same export
prices and obtain the same profits as unconstrained pure exporters.
Firms choose their type in order to maximize profits with full information of both their pro-
ductivity and demand shifters. Table 1 summarizes the different firm types that can potentially
coexist in the country offering subsidies with ESR.
Differences between Pure and Regular Constrained Exporters. Firstly, we want to em-
phasize the fact that a single ESR threshold η P p0, 1q generates both pure exporters and regular
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Table 1: Firm Types Operating in a Country that Offers Subsidies with Export Share Requirements
Firm type Export Intensity Does the firm receive
subsidies with ESR?
Does the firm distort
its prices/mode of op-
eration to obtain sub-
sidies?
Domestic (k “ d) – No No
Ineligible regular ex-
porters (k “ dxn)
p0, ηq No No
Unconstrained regular
exporters (k “ dxu)
pη, 1q Yes No
Unconstrained pure ex-
porters (k “ xu)
1 Yes No
Constrained regular ex-
porters (k “ dxc)
η Yes Yes
Constrained pure ex-
porters (k “ xc)
1 Yes Yes
exporters exactly satisfying the ESR threshold. Constrained exporters can either choose to sell
both at home and abroad with an export intensity of η — as established in Lemma 1 — by altering
their prices in response to subsidies with ESR, or can decide to export all their output. Although
variable profits are lower in the latter option — since Θp1q´Θpηq ă 0 — firms can avoid incurring
the domestic fixed cost fH if they become constrained pure exporters.
Pure and regular constrained exporters also follow different pricing strategies. A constrained
regular exporter sets prices (7) and (8) in order to achieve export intensity η. In so doing, it
increases its gross (before subsidies) domestic price and lowers the price it charges abroad. The
optimal prices set by a constrained regular exporter are therefore linked across destinations and
are also dependent on the market size of both countries. More precisely,
Proposition 1 A constrained regular exporter receiving subsidies with ESR sets a higher price in
the domestic market and a lower price in the foreign market than if the ESR were not binding.
Proof. This result follows directly from the fact that the terms in brackets in equations (7) and (8)
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are respectively greater than 1 and lower than τHF when η P
`
ηdxH pωq, 1
˘
.
Thus, a binding ESR constraint induces exporters to reduce domestic sales and to increase the
output exported in order to achieve export intensity η. Conversely, a constrained firm that decides
to give up its domestic sales does not distort the markup it charges on export sales beyond the
direct effect of the sales subsidy. However, if the mass of constrained pure exporters increases, the
number of varieties available to home consumers falls, thereby increasing the domestic price index
and lowering the level of competition domestically. Thus, as the level of subsidies subject to an
ESR increase and the share of constrained exporters rises accordingly, the level of competition in
the country enacting the subsidies falls and protection for the least profitable firms heightens. This
result follows from the fact that the price index defined in (3) is increasing in the average price
charged by firms, but decreasing in the number of varieties available for consumption. Solving for
the general equilibrium in our model when one country makes use of subsidies with ESR allows us
to provide a magnitude of the distortions generated by this policy.
General Equilibrium. We now describe the conditions that characterize the general equilibrium
in our model. As noted above, we assume that only Home offers subsidies with ESR — this is the
only difference between the two countries in our benchmark. We assume that the Home government
runs a balanced budget and finances subsidies by imposing a lump-sum tax on households.
Choosing labor at Home as the numeraire (wH “ 1), and given a vector of subsidies psr, sf q,
equilibrium in the model is characterized by a vector of seven endogenous variables,
!
MH ,MF , PH , PF , EH , EF , wF
)
,
all of which have been defined above, with the exception of MH and MF , which denote the mass
of operating firms at Home and Foreign respectively. Equilibrium is such that in each country,
(i) the labor market clears,
(ii) expected profits of entering the market exactly cover entry costs,
(iii) Total expenditure in country i is given by: Ei “ wiLi ´ Ti, where Ti is the aggregate tax
revenue used to finance export subsidies,
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and international trade is balanced. Appendix F describes the algorithm used to solve the model
numerically, and spells out in detail the market-clearing equations listed above.
4 Calibration
This section describes the procedure used to assign values to the endowments, preferences and
technology parameters of our model economy. We calibrate our model so as to reproduce salient
features of the distribution of export intensity of a developing country that does not provide sub-
sidies with ESR.
Natural Export Intensity Distribution. As we discussed in Section 3, the consequences of
subsidies conditioned on ESR depend crucially on the natural distribution of export intensity that
would have prevailed in a country had such subsidies not been available. For instance, relatively
few firms would choose to change their mode of operation — to become either constrained pure or
regular exporters — in response to a given subsidy and ESR threshold combination if the natural
export intensity distribution was highly skewed to the left. Conversely, in a country where high-
intensity exporters are more prevalent, fewer firms would choose to distort their prices to receive
the subsidy. However, it is possible that the aggregate expenditure in subsidies would be higher
in the latter scenario — potentially making a given subsidy more distortive — because there are
more firms eligible to receive subsidies.
We utilize cross-country firm-level data drawn from the World Bank’s Enterprise Surveys
(WBES) for the years 2002-2012 to construct a natural export intensity distribution that is not
distorted by subsidies with ESR and that will serve as the benchmark for our quantitative exer-
cise. Our sample consists of manufacturing exporters operating in the twenty largest developing
and transition countries in terms of population (i.e. those with at least 30 million inhabitants),
for which there are at least 100 exporters available in WBES. Since our objective is to infer the
counterfactual distribution that would have prevailed in China in the absence of subsidies with
ESR, we therefore choose to use relatively large countries to construct our natural export intensity
distribution; moreover, Defever and Rian˜o (2015b) find that the share of high-intensity exporters
observed in a country is crucially influenced by its size.
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We collect information on whether a country provides or not subsidies with ESR from the
Investment Climate Statements produced by the U.S. State Department.26 Table 2 presents the
countries included in our sample, as well as the number of exporters and the share of high-intensity
(i.e. those with export intensity above 70%) exporters operating in each country. The last three
columns of the table indicate whether subsidies with ESR are also conditioned on a firm’s location
or ownership status. The column “Everywhere” indicates that any firm can benefit from subsidies
with ESR regardless of their location; “within a FTZ” indicates that the subsides are only available
to firms located in a Free Trade Zone, and the last column “FIE” indicates that only Foreign-
Invested Enterprises are eligible. Since countries often implement several policy measures subject
to ESR at the same time, these categories are not mutually exclusive.
Figure 4: Export Intensity Distribution According to Availability of Subsidies with ESR in Large
Developing Countries
Argentina 
Colombia 
Kenya 
Mexico 
Poland 
Russia 
South Africa 
Ukraine 
Countries without  
Export Share Requirements 
Countries with  
Export Share Requirements 
Bangladesh 
Brazil 
Egypt 
Ethiopia 
India 
Indonesia 
Morocco 
Pakistan 
Philippines 
Thailand 
Turkey 
Vietnam 
The figure depicts the kernel density of export intensity, which is defined as the share of
exports in total sales for firms reporting a positive value of exports. Data are from the World
Bank’s Enterprise Surveys (WBES) for the period 2002-2012.
Table 2 highlights the prevalence of ESR across developing counties; twelve out of the twenty
26The Investment Climate Statements are publicly available for the years 2005 to 2012 at http://2001-2009.
state.gov/e/eeb/ifd/2005/ and http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/. The information on the availability
of subsidies with ESR is found in the sections on “Performance Requirements and Incentives” and “Foreign Trade
Zones/Free Trade Zones”.
22
countries in our sample offer incentives to firms conditioned on fulfilling an explicit export share
requirement. Figure 4 presents the distribution of export intensity for exporters based on the
availability of subsidies with ESR. Once again, the difference between the two distributions is
remarkable — on average half of exporters in countries offering subsidies with ESR export 70%
or more of their output, while only 12% do so in countries that do not offer these subsidies (the
distribution for the latter group of firms closely resembles the one for domestically-owned Chinese
firms located outside FTZ presented in Figure 2). This marked contrast provides further suggestive
evidence regarding the role of subsidies with ESR in distorting the distribution of export intensity.
Thus, we will use the export intensity distribution for exporters located in non-ESR countries — the
solid line in Figure 4 — as the natural export intensity distribution when calibrating our model. It
is important to note that when computing both the densities in Figure 4 and the moments targeted
in the calibration, each firm-level export intensity observation is weighted so that each country
receives an equal weight. This ensures that the distributions are not driven by outliers, or sample
size and population differences across countries.
Assigned Parameters. In order to calibrate our model, we assume that both Home and Foreign
countries are identical in terms of their labour endowments and model parameters. Thus, firms in
both countries draw productivity and destination-specific demand shifters from the same distribu-
tions. This assumption also implies that the fixed costs of entry and operation in each market are
such that fei “ fej “ fe, fii “ fjj “ fd and fij “ fji “ fx for i, j P tH,F u and i ‰ j. Since scaling
up or down all fixed costs by the same amount does not affect the aggregate variables of interest
— just as in Melitz and Redding (2015) — we normalize the domestic fixed cost fd to 1.
We assume that both Home and Foreign have the same population, so that L “ 1. If one
considers Home (i.e. the country enacting subsidies with ESR) to be China, then this assumption
implies that Foreign in our model corresponds to a country with the combined population of the
U.S., Canada and the EU (Khandelwal et al., 2014).
We set the elasticity of substitution, σ, equal to 3, based on Broda and Weinstein (2006).27
27We have also experimented with an elasticity of substitution of 3.5, which is the average value of the median
import demand elasticities at the SITC 3-digit level for Argentina, Colombia, Mexico and Poland, the four countries
belonging to our undistorted benchmark for which Broda et al. (2006) have estimates available, and which is in turn
very close to China’s estimate of 3.42, and our results remain robust. Table H.1 presents further robustness checks
in which we perturb our calibrated parameters one at a time.
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Firms in both countries draw their productivity realizations from a Pareto distribution with lower
bound 1 and shape parameter a. Following Helpman et al. (2004), we estimate a ´ pσ ´ 1q by
regressing the logarithm of a firm’s employment ranking on the logarithm of its employment level
using data from our sample of countries not offering subsidies with ESR. The estimated coefficient
of 0.713 implies a value of a “ 3.213, given our choice of σ.
Similarly to other model parameters, the iceberg transport cost incurred is assumed to be the
same for both countries, i.e. τHF “ τFH “ τ . In models that do not feature firm-destination-
specific demand shifters (e.g. Melitz and Redding, 2015), transport costs are usually calibrated to
match a country’s mean export intensity.28 In our model, however, changes in transport costs or
in the mean of demand shifters both affect the export intensity distribution. The only difference
between transport costs and the mean of export demand shifters, is that the former affects the
price of exports relative to the domestic market price while the latter does not. Since we do not
have information on prices that allows us to separately identify the two parameters, we set τ equal
to 1.7 following Anderson and van Wincoop (2004).
Calibrated Parameters. There are 5 parameters that remain to be calibrated, which we choose
so as to minimize the distance between a number of moments in the model and in the data. These
are the sunk cost of entry, fe, the fixed cost of exporting, fx, and the parameters governing
the distribution of firm-specific domestic and export demand shifters. We assume that the latter
are both drawn from lognormal distributions with parameters pµd, σ2dq and pµx, σ2xq, which denote
the mean and variance of the underlying normal distribution for each demand shifter. We set
µd “ ´0.5σ2d so that domestic demand shifters have a mean of 1. The moments we target are the
share of exporting firms (37.42%) and the 10th, 50th, 75th and 90th percentiles of the distribution
of export intensity in countries that do not provide subsidies with ESR.
Table 3 summarizes the parameters used to solve the model. Our model fits the distribution of
export intensity quite well, as Figure 5 shows, although we overstate the share of pure exporters,
which is not a targeted moment. The model implies an employment size premium for exporters
vis-a`-vis domestic firms of 1.17 log points (relative to 1.31 in our sample of non-ESR countries),
28Recall that in the Melitz (2003) model with identical countries, all exporters have the same export intensity,
τ1´σ{p1` τ1´σq.
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which is very close to the estimates by Bernard et al. (2007) and Mayer and Ottaviano (2007) for
U.S. and European firms (1.19 and 1.21) respectively.
Table 3: Parameter Values
Description Value
Assigned parameters:
Country size (L) 1
Elasticity of substitution (σ) 3
Shape parameter productivity distribution (a) 2.713
Scale parameter productivity distribution (ϕ) 1
Fixed cost — domestic sales (fd) 1
Transport cost (τ) 1.7
Calibrated parameters:
Fixed cost — entry (fe) 10.342
Fixed cost — exporting (fx) 0.637
Domestic demand shifters
`
lnpziiq „ N pµd, σ2dq
˘
(-0.634, 1.267)
Export demand shifters
`
lnpzijq „ N pµx, σ2xq
˘
(-1.807, 0.507)
Figure 5: Model Fit — Export Intensity Distribution in Countries without Subsidies with ESR
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The figure depicts the probability density function of export intensity (conditional on
exporting) after simulating the model 1,000 times and compares it with the empirical
density calculated for the sample of countries that do not provide subsidies with ESR.
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5 The Effect of Subsidies with Export Share Requirements
We now investigate the effect of introducing subsidies with export share requirements on prices,
the distribution of export intensity, the intensity of competition and welfare in our model economy.
As we have documented in Section 2, there is a large number of policy measures that provide
subsidies subject to ESR in China. Besides differences in the underlying policy (e.g. tax holidays,
access to soft loans, subsidized utilities), these incentives also differ in terms of their specific ESR
thresholds (in some cases these can even be firm-specific), additional location and/or ownership
requirements and administrative scope (i.e. the available incentives vary at the national, provincial
and prefecture-city level). Thus, carrying out a comprehensive quantitative assessment of the
consequences of subsidies with ESR in China is beyond the scope of this paper.
We instead choose to pursue a more modest objective. In order to investigate the effect of
subsidies with ESR we focus on the corporate income tax deduction available to firm with an export
intensity above 70% to anchor our quantitative exercise. To be precise, FIEs and Chinese-owned
firms located in FTZ satisfying the aforementioned ESR enjoyed a reduction of their corporate
income tax rate from 30 to 10% between 1991 and 2008. This policy is appealing because is set
at the national level and has a broad coverage (Figure B.1 in Appendix B shows that the FTZ
location requirement is not unduly restrictive).
As it is well known, the gross profit of a firm under monopolistic competition facing iso-elastic
demand is proportional to its revenue. Hence, profits after corporate income tax, t, are given by
pipωq “ p1´tq rrpωq{σ ´ f s, where rpωq denotes a firm’s total sales revenue and f its total fixed cost
bill. Thus, reducing the corporate income tax rate faced by firms satisfying a 70% ESR from 30%
to 10% implies a 28.6% (=0.9/0.7) increase in both gross profits and the fixed cost bill compared
to firms that do not comply with the export requirement. Given the vector of sales and fixed
cost subsidies analyzed in the previous section, the aforementioned corporate income tax deduction
would be equivalent to an ad-valorem sales subsidy sr “ 8.7% (since this subsidy increases gross
profits by a factor p1 ` srqσ, it follows that 0.087 « 1.2861{3 ´ 1, given our choice of σ “ 3) and
a fixed cost tax, sf “ ´28.6% vis-a`-vis firms that do not fulfill the requirement. Notice, however,
that if the corporate income tax was levied on gross profits, this would entail setting the fixed cost
subsidy equal to zero.
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In order to elucidate how subsidies with ESR operate, we assume that the sales subsidy is
granted based on a firm’s export sales rather than on its total sales, while also abstracting from
the fixed cost subsidy.29 Doing so, allows us to compare the subsidy subject to an ESR with an
equivalent (in the sense of the total expenditure on subsidies being the same in both scenarios)
unconditional export subsidy and laissez-faire. Thus, in our benchmark experiment, we assume
that the government at Home offers an 8.7% ad-valorem subsidy to export sales for firms with an
export intensity of at least 70%.
We first investigate how the use of a subsidy with ESR affects the mode of operation choice for
firms at Home. As Figure 5 shows, 10.2% of exporters, the majority of which are pure exporters,
have a natural export intensity above 70%. Following the introduction of the export sales subsidy
with ESR, the share of exporters with an export intensity above the ESR threshold doubles. To put
this figure in context, the export sales subsidy subject to an ESR that we consider in our experiment
would account for 43% of the exporters with an export intensity of 70% or above observed in China
between 2000 and 2006. Notably, the greatest change takes place at the upper bound of the export
intensity distribution, as the share of pure exporters increases by 6.88 percentage points, while
4.3% of exporters choose to operate as constrained regular exporters, achieving exactly a 70%
export intensity. As we noted in Section 3 above, more firms choose to operate as constrained
pure exporters instead of at the ESR threshold when their domestic demand is small compared
to that faced abroad and also when the fixed cost of operating domestically is high relative to
that associated with exporting. Nevertheless, our quantitative exercise is likely to overestimate
the mass point in the distribution of export intensity at 70%, since we are not taking into account
the potential administrative burden that firms subject to ESR face when selling domestically. For
instance, firms need to demonstrate that they effectively sell less than 30% of their output on the
domestic market, for instance by using different production establishments or separated production
lines for their export and domestic sales production; pure exporters, on the other hand, are likely
to be less affected by these.
Firms that go on to operate facing an ESR while selling both at Home and Foreign have a
mean natural export intensity of 54%, which is approximately twice as large as the overall average
29Offering an 8.7% total sales subsidy in addition to a 28.6% fixed cost tax as discussed above yields similar
qualitative results as those produced by our benchmark policy experiment discussed below. From a quantitative
standpoint, the effect of the policy on aggregate exports, the intensity of competition and welfare is less pronounced.
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natural export intensity under laissez-faire. This follows because the distortion in profits caused
by the ESR is lower the closer a firm’s natural export intensity is to the ESR threshold, and is
therefore more easily compensated by a given subsidy. Maintaining the natural export intensity
constant, we find that constrained regular exporters are 35% more productive than the average
Home exporter when there are no subsidies in place, while constrained pure exporters are 25% less
productive than the same reference group. Thus, we can see that the selection pattern induced by
the ESR constraint is heterogeneous with respect to firms’ productivity. On the one hand, firms
that operate at the ESR threshold are sufficiently productive to incur the fixed costs involved in
selling at home and abroad. On the other hand, relatively less productive firms prefer instead to
become constrained pure exporters, since by doing so they gain access to the export subsidies and
economize the fixed cost required to selling domestically.
Table 4 presents the impact of export subsidies, both unconditional and with ESR, vis-a`-vis
laissez faire on several equilibrium variables such as exports/GDP, price indices, the unconditional
probability of firm exit and welfare. In this exercise, we contrast the 8.7% subsidy on export sales
granted to firms with an export intensity of at least 70% with a 2.9% ad-valorem export sales
subsidy made available to all exporters regardless of their export intensity, both of which result in
Home’s aggregate expenditure on export subsidies being 0.19% of GDP.
We begin by noting that subsidies with ESR share several key features with unconditional export
subsidies. Both policy instruments increase aggregate exports in the enacting country, deteriorate
its terms-of-trade, reduce welfare and produce qualitatively similar effects on its trade partners.
More precisely, the provision of export subsidies at Home lowers the price of (at least some of)
Home’s export varieties, intensifying import competition in Foreign and lowering the price index
there. Restoring trade balance, in turn, requires Foreign’s wage to fall so that firms operating there
become more competitive, and ultimately, increase their exports to Home. The fall in the price
index in Foreign more than compensates the fall in its nominal wage, and thus welfare (i.e. real
income) in Foreign increases at the expense of Home (Felbermayr et al., 2012).30
Unlike unconditional export subsidies, however, Table 4 shows that subsidies with ESR increase
30Demidova and Rodr´ıguez-Clare (2009) also find that unconditional export subsidies lower Home’s terms-of-trade
and welfare. Since they model a small economy, however, Home’s export subsidies do not affect price indices or
welfare in the rest of the world.
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Table 4: Comparison of Export Subsidies
Variable Subsidy with Export Unconditional Export
Share Requirements Subsidy
(1) (2)
% change w.r.t. laissez-faire
Wage, Foreign -2.180 -1.157
Price index, Home 0.137 -0.092
Price index, Foreign -2.422 -1.274
Probability of exit, Home -6.537 -0.872
Probability of exit, Foreign -1.155 -0.556
Welfare, Home -0.829 -0.096
Welfare, Foreign 0.406 0.118
Exports/GDP 6.322 2.263
percentage point change w.r.t. laissez-faire
Share of Home Exporters
with export intensity
P r0.7, 1q 4.300 -0.400
“ 1 6.880 0.106
Column (1) compares an 8.7% ad-valorem subsidy to export sales granted to firms with an export
intensity of at least 70% with the laissez-faire equilibrium. Column (2) compares a 2.9% ad-valorem
subsidy to export sales made available to all exporting firms regardless of their export intensity
with the laissez-faire equilibrium. Both subsidy schemes result in aggregate subsidy expenditure
accounting for 0.19% of Home’s GDP. Neither Home nor Foreign conducts any trade policy under
laissez-faire, but trade costs in both directions are maintained at their calibrated level (1.7) across
all scenarios.
the price index in the enacting country. Recall that in order for a constrained exporter to satisfy
the 70% ESR, it needs to reduce its local sales, thereby increasing the price it charges domestically.
On average, constrained regular exporters set a 23.8% higher markup on domestic prices relative to
what they would have charged without subsidies. Similarly, albeit more extremely, as more firms
decide to become pure exporters, their varieties stop being available to Home consumers altogether.
Both channels contribute to increase the price index at Home, which increases by 0.13%. Conversely,
when unconditional export subsidies are in place, the lower price of imports from Foreign as well as
the selection effect induced by tougher import competition put downward pressure on Home’s price
index. The higher profitability of operating domestically for Home firms when ESR are in place
also results in firms being more likely to remain in operation after learning the realization of their
productivity and demand shifters relative to the laissez-faire and unconditional export subsidies
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scenarios.
We find that the subsidy with ESR has a quantitatively important effect on aggregate outcomes.
The subsidy with ESR boosts exports (as a share of GDP) by 6.32%, while the unconditional sub-
sidy only increases this share by 2.26%. The imposition of an export requirement also reduces
the likelihood of firm exit more than the unconditional subsidy — a 6.5% reduction relative to
laissez-faire instead of the 0.87% fall produced by the latter. Crucially, the additional distortions
introduced by the ESR result in a substantially larger welfare loss for the enacting country; real
income at Home falls by 0.83% with ESR, while the equivalent unconditional export subsidy re-
sults in a 0.096% welfare loss. Foreign, on the other hand, benefits from the availability of cheaper
imported goods from Home, but its perceived welfare gain is always lower than Home’s loss.
Using an Alternative Natural Export Intensity Benchmark. One concern regarding our
calibration strategy is that the undistorted distribution of export intensity is based on countries
that are too different from China in terms of their openness to trade and attractiveness as a location
to set up multinational affiliates.31 Since the corporate income tax deduction conditioned on a 70%
ESR in China was terminated in 2008, and fully phased out by 2013, we explore the robustness of
our results by using the export intensity distribution observed in China in 2013 as the ‘undistorted’
scenario to recalibrate our model parameters using the same target moments as in our benchmark
above.32 It is important to keep in mind, however, that other policy measures featuring export
requirements are likely to remain in place in 2013, and these can bias our estimation of China’s
natural export intensity distribution toward high export intensity levels.
Figure 6 presents the distribution of export intensity for Chinese manufacturing firms sampled
by the WBES in 2002 and 2013. Crucially, the distribution in 2002 is quite similar to the one
calculated with the more representative survey carried out by the Chinese National Bureau of
Statistics (NBS) and presented in Figure 1 — more precisely, the shares of regular exporters with
an export intensity of at least 70% and pure exporters in the 2002 wave of WBES are 23% and 17.3%
respectively; the same shares in the NBS survey are 24.9% and 24.5%. The similitude displayed
31As Antra`s and Yeaple (2014) note, multinational firms’ affiliates tend to be larger, more productive, and crucially,
more export-oriented than non-multinational firms.
32In a Papers & Proceedings article (Defever and Rian˜o, 2015a), we have used the distribution of export intensity
observed in China in 2013 to illustrate the effect of a subsidy with a 100% ESR in a simplified version of our model
without firm-destination-specific demand shifters.
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by the NBS and WBES surveys in 2002 is reassuring when interpreting the distribution based on
the latter wave of the WBES survey as a suitable proxy for the distribution of export intensity
prevailing in China in 2013. Figure 6 reveals that high-intensity exporters are considerably less
prevalent in 2013 than in the 2000-2006 period (firms with export intensity above 70% account for
20.2% of exporters in 2013). The share of exporters in China in 2013 — the other moment used to
calibrate our model — is 32.6, a similar figure to that observed in the 2000-2006 period (27.90%),
and in our benchmark sample of countries not offering subsidies with ESR (37.42%).
Figure 6: Export Intensity Distribution in China in 2002 and 2013 (WBES data)
China 2013 
China 2002 
The figure depicts the kernel density of export intensity — the share of exports in total
sales — for Chinese manufacturing firms reporting a positive value of exports. Data are
drawn from the World Bank’s Enterprise Survey carried out in China in the years 2000
and 2013.
Table G.1 in Appendix G presents the parameters calibrated under this alternative scenario,
and Table G.2 reports the results of our comparison. From a qualitative standpoint, the findings
obtained under our benchmark specification remain unaltered. Quantitatively, the aggregate ex-
penditure on subsidies increases substantially — from 0.19 to 0.67% of GDP — when Home offers
an 8.7% subsidy rate on export sales conditioned on a 70% ESR. This happens both because there
are more exporters that are naturally eligible to receive subsidies, but also due to a larger number
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of firms choosing to become constrained exporters. Under this parametrization the overall effect of
subsidies on the strength of domestic competition, exports and welfare is considerably larger than
in our benchmark.
Further Robustness Analysis. We investigate further the robustness of our results by perturbing
individual model parameters in our benchmark scenario to ensure that our conclusions are not
unduly driven by our chosen parametrization. Thus, we increase one parameter of interest at a
time by 10% relative to its value in the benchmark calibration and report the comparison between
equilibria with subsidies conditioned on ESR and laissez-faire. The results of this exercise are
presented in Table H.1 in Appendix H. Our quantitative results are indeed remarkably robust to
changes in the parametrization of the model.
6 Conclusions
China’s successful insertion into the global economy has spurred great interest in the economic
policies that made this feat possible. In this paper we have documented the widespread use of
subsidies subject to export share requirements in China implemented after the opening-up reforms
in the late 1970s, and yet, still in place after China joined the WTO in 2001 — a practice that
has proven to be a contentious issue with other member countries. We have studied how this
policy affects individual firms’ pricing and production decisions as well as its effects on the level
of competition and aggregate welfare through the lens of a two-country model of trade with firm
heterogeneity across productivity and demand appeal.
Our model shows that offering subsidies with ESR distorts the distribution of export intensity
(conditional on exporting) in a country, skewing it towards the right. Crucially, the imposition
of a single ESR strictly below 100% can induce firms to either increase their domestic prices and
decrease their export prices so as to satisfy the constraint threshold, or, to stop producing for the
domestic market altogether becoming pure exporters. In our quantitative exercise, we evaluate the
impact of one country offering an 8.7% ad-valorem export sales subsidy subject to a 70% ESR —
a policy of similar magnitude to a corporate income tax rate reduction available to foreign-owned
firms and domestically-owned firms located in free trade zones between 1991 and 2008. Our results
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show that a subsidy with ESR of this magnitude can account for approximately 43% of the share
of exporters in China exhibiting an export intensity of at least 70%, with the majority of these
being pure exporters, a feature which is consistent with the data. We find that subsidies with
ESR increase aggregate exports more and provide greater protection to low-profitability firms than
an equivalent unconditional export subsidy — resulting in protectionism through exporting. The
distortions induced by the subsidy subject to ESR, however exacerbate the welfare losses produced
by the standard textbook export subsidy.
Our findings open up exciting avenues for future research. It would be interesting, for instance,
to understand the political economy objectives that have motivated China and other developing
countries to employ incentives subject to export requirements. These policies could provide a
politically-feasible alternative to full unilateral trade liberalization by eliciting the support of do-
mestic producers, which are likely to be negatively affected by greater trade openness. Another
interesting line of inquiry has to do with the dynamic consequences of subsidies subject to ESR.
Our current analysis has shown that they produce substantial static welfare losses; however it is
possible that if these subsidies help to foster rapid industrialization, their dynamic gains could more
than compensate the distortions that we have identified in this paper.
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Appendix
A Data used to Construct Figures 1 and 2
Figures 1 is constructed using data drawn from the annual survey of Chinese manufacturing firms
compiled by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). Figure 2, requires merging the NBS firm-level
survey with transaction-level customs data from the Chinese General Administration of Customs
so as to identify firms which based on their type, location and export intensity are more likely to
be eligible to receive subsidies with ESR.
The NBS firm-level data includes state-owned enterprises and private firms with sales above 5
million Chinese Yuan; it contains detailed balance sheet information as well as firms’ ownership
status and total export sales. Firms in the survey account for approximately 95% of China’s
industrial output and 98% of its manufacturing exports.
The unit of observation in the NBS manufacturing survey is the firm, i.e. a legal unit (faren
danwei). These need to satisfy the following requirements: (i) be established legally, having their
own names, organization, location and being able to take civil liability; (ii) possess and use their
assets independently, assume liabilities and be entitled to sign contracts with other units; and (iii)
be financially independent and compile their own balance sheets (Brandt et al., 2014). This is the
same level of aggregation at which the subsidies with ESR we document in the paper are defined.
Using the firm as our unit of analysis means that all variables of interest are calculated at the
firm-level. For instance, the export intensity of multi-plant firms is calculated using total exports
and total sales across all establishments that belong to the same firm. Again, this is coherent with
the subsidies being defined at the firm- rather than at the establishment-level. Multi-plant firms
however, constitute a minority in the NBS manufacturing survey; Brandt et al. (2012) document
that single-plant firms account for more than 95% of the observations in the NBS manufacturing
survey over the 1998-2007 period.
While the NBS data records firms’ ownership status and their headquarters’ physical address
(which we use to determine if a firm is foreign-owned and whether or not is located in a FTZ
respectively), it does not allow us to identify processing trade enterprises (PTE) because it does
not record the value of exports sold through different customs regimes. To obtain information
about a firm’s reliance on processing exports, we merge the NBS dataset with transaction-level
customs data.
To clean the data and rule out outliers, we follow Brandt et al. (2012). We drop observations
that report missing, null or negative values for total output, employment, intermediate inputs, fixed
capital, value-added or if export intensity exceeds 1. We also exclude firms with operation status
recorded as ‘inactive’, ‘bankrupt’ or ‘closed’. Lastly, we drop a small number of observations in
which firms report zero exports in the manufacturing survey but show positive export transactions
in the customs data for that particular year. In order to ensure a coherent and comparable industry
classification over time we use the industry concordances suggested by Brandt et al. (2012).
Table A.1 presents summary statistics for the NBS firm-level and matched data. After cleaning
the data, the NBS firm-level sample consists of 1,100,600 firm-year observations with exporting
firms accounting for 28% of observations. We follow Manova and Yu (2012) and match the firm-
level and customs data using firms’ names as a common variable. By doing so, we are able to
match approximately half of the observations reporting a positive value of exports in the NBS
sample with their respective customs records. A detailed description of the matching procedure
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is provided in the appendix of Wang and Yu (2012). Although each dataset uses different firm
identifiers, a firm’s name is a reliable match variable because by law two firms are not allowed to
have the same name in the same administrative region. The matched firms account for 47% of
export volume for 2002-2006. Despite the loss of a large number of observations for exporters in
the matching process, Table A.2 below shows that the export intensity distribution of our matched
sample is almost identical to that produced by the NBS data.
Table A.1: Summary Statistics
NBS Manufacturing Survey, 2000-2006 Matched Data, 2000-2006
Number of Percentage Number of Percentage
observations observations
Domestic firms 793,494 72.10 793,494 83.90
Exporting firms 307,106 27.90 152,217 16.10
Total 1,100,600 100 945,711 100
Firm Type and Location. We classify firms as processing trade enterprises based on how much
they rely on the processing regime to sell abroad. We find that the distribution of export processing
share exhibits a clear bimodal pattern: 72.1% of exporters use the processing regime for less than
10% of their export sales, while 15.5% sell more than 90% of their exports through processing.
Thus, we define Processing Trade Enterprises (PTE) as firms selling more than 90% of their
exports through processing trade. Based on this definition, PTEs may include firms that export all
their output as well as firms selling domestically and abroad. We next identify Foreign-Invested
Enterprises (FIE) as firms with a positive amount of foreign capital but that do not satisfy the
criteria to be considered PTEs, and Firms located in a Free Trade Zone (FTZ) are firms
situated in prefecture-level cities that feature Special Economic Zones, Coastal Development Zones
or that belong to the Yangtze and Pearl River Delta Economic Zones. Our definition of FTZ
excludes smaller industrial parks such as ‘Economic and Technological Development Zones’, ‘New
and High-Tech Industrial Development Zones’ and ‘Export Processing Zones’, which also benefit
from preferential treatment conditioned on ESR. Many of these have been set up along the coastline
within prefecture-level cities already classified as FTZ in our definition.33 Based on their location,
ownership and customs status, more than 90% of all exporters in our sample are likely to be eligible
to receive subsidies with ESR.
Table A.2 shows that half of exporters have an export intensity below 70%, while the group of
high-intensity exporters is evenly split between exporters with an export intensity of at least 70%
but that also sell their output domestically and pure exporters, each accounting for approximately
a quarter of all exporting firms. Since Chinese-owned PTEs represent less than 0.7% of exporters,
we dropped them, and group exporters based on their ownership status in order to compare the
shares of regular and high-intensity exporters across firm types. High-intensity exporters are more
prevalent among foreign-owned firms, and within this group, the subset of firms primarily engaged
in export processing exhibit the highest share of high-intensity exporters. Interestingly, more than
33Using a word search on firms’ addresses, Schminke and van Biesebroeck (2011) report 891 new firms established
in ‘Economic and Technological Development Zones’ between 1999 and 2005, and 47% of them were located either in
the Yangtze or Pearl River Delta Economic zone, already accounted as a FTZ in our definition. Tracking firms located
in an ‘Export Processing Zone’ in our data is easier since the customs data provides a special coding identifying them.
However, in 2006, only 166 firms can be classified as being located in any of these zones, and among them, 85% are
located in a city which is already classified as a FTZ in our definition.
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a third of PTEs sell 30% or more of their output domestically. This challenges the commonly held
view that firms engaged in processing activities are fully specialized in production for exporting
(Brandt and Morrow, 2013).
Table A.2: Percentage of Exporters by Export Intensity, Firm Type and Location
Export Intensity
p0, 0.7q r0.7, 1q 1
NBS Manufacturing Survey 50.49 24.94 24.56
Matched Data 50.82 25.56 23.62
‚ Chinese-owned firms (neither PTE nor FIE) 65.30 21.53 13.18
- In a Free Trade Zone (neither PTE nor FIE) 61.47 23.67 14.85
- Outside a Free Trade Zone (neither PTE nor FIE) 76.25 15.37 8.37
‚ Foreign-owned firms (FIE or PTE) 43.20 27.68 29.12
- Processing Trade Enterprises (PTE) 31.36 29.78 38.86
- Foreign-Invested Enterprises (FIE) 50.07 26.46 23.47
3
B List of Free Trade Zones
Special Economic Zones: They include six prefectures: Haikou, Sanya, Shantou Shi, Shenzhen,
Xiamen, Zhuhai and the entire province of Hainan.
Coastal Development Zones: They include the Shanghai Economic area established in 1982.
This zone does not cover entirely the Shanghai prefecture, and does not include the city center
of Shanghai. We make use of firm’s postcode to exclude firms located in the city center from our
definition of FTZ, i.e. postcodes starting with “2000”.
Coastal Development Zones also include the prefecture-cities of Anshan, Baoding, Beihai, Dalian,
Dandong, Fuzhou, Guangzhou, Jinan, Langfang, Lianyungang, Nantong, Ningbo, Qingdao, Qin-
huangdao, Quanzhou, Shenyang, Shijiazhuang, Tianjin, Weifang, Wenzhou, Weihai, Yantai, Yingkou,
Zhanjiang, Zhangzhou, Zibo.
Yangtze River Delta Economic Zone: It includes cities located in the Yangtze River Delta but
also some cities located outside the area due to mutual economic development. In 1982, the Chinese
government set up the Shanghai Economic Area. Besides Shanghai, 4 cities in Jiangsu (Changzhou,
Nantong, Suzhou, Wuxi) and 5 cities in Zhejiang (Hangzhou, Huzhou, Jiaxing, Ningbo, Shaoxing)
were included. In 1992, a 14-city cooperative joint meeting was launched. Besides the previous
10 cities, the members included Nanjing, Yangzhou and Zhenjiang in Jiangsu, and Zhoushan in
Zhejiang. In 1998, Taizhou became a new member.
Pearl River Delta Economic Zone: The boundaries of the Pearl River Delta economic zone
differ from those associated with the geographic boundaries of the delta. In 1985, the State Council
designated the Pearl River Delta as an open economic zone. It contained three Special Economic
Zones that were established earlier: Shantou, Shenzhen and Zhuhai. Other leading cities in the
open zone are: Dongguan, Foshan, Guangzhou, Huizhou, Jiangmen and Zhongshan. ‘Peripheral’
cities that were declared open cities include: Chaozhou, Heyuan, Jieyang, Maoming, Meizhou,
Qingyuan, Shanwei, Shaoguan, Yangjiang, Zhanjiang and Zhaoqing.
Figure B.1: Free Trade Zones Established Between 1979 and 2000
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C Proof of Lemma 1
The Lagrangian of program (6) is:
L “ p1`srq
`
AHHpωqppηHHq1´σ `AHF pωqppηHF q1´σ
˘´ˆwH
ϕ
˙`
AHHpωqppηHHq´σ ` τHFAHF pωqppηHF q´σ
˘´
p1´ sf qpfHH ` fHF qwH ` λ
„
AHF pωqppηHF q1´σ
AHHpωqppηHHq1´σ `AHF pωqppηHF q1´σ
´ η

, (C.1)
where λ ě 0 is the multiplier associated with the ESR constraint. The first-order conditions
(FOC) are given by:
rpηHHs : ´pσ ´ 1qp1` srqAHHpωqppηHHq´σ ` σpwH{ϕqAHHpωqppηHHq´σ´1`
λpσ ´ 1q
„
AHHpωqAHF pωqppηHHq´σppηHF q1´σ
pAHHpωqppηHHq1´σ `AHF pωqppηHF q1´σq2

“ 0, (C.2)
rpηHF s : pσ ´ 1qp1` srqAHF pωqppηHF q´σ ` σpτHFwH{ϕqAHF pωqppηHF q´σ´1´
λpσ ´ 1q
„
AHHpωqAHF pωqppηHF q´σppηHHq1´σ
pAHHpωqppηHHq1´σ `AHF pωqppηHF q1´σq2

“ 0, (C.3)
and,
rλs : AHF pωqpp
η
HF q1´σ
AHHpωqppηHHq1´σ `AHF pωqppηHF q1´σ
´ η ě 0. (C.4)
Assume by way of contradiction that when ηdxH pωq “ τ
1´σ
HF AHF pωq
AHHpωq`τ1´σHF AHF pωq
ă η, the ESR con-
straint is not binding. This implies that λ “ 0. Solving the system of equations given by (C.2) and
(C.3), it follows that pηHH “ 11`sr σσ´1 wHϕ and pηHF “ τHF pHH . This in turn implies that a firm’s
export intensity is equal to ηdxH pωq, which does not satisfy the ESR constraint. Therefore, the ESR
constraint is binding for a firm that chooses to sell at home and abroad and receives subsidies with
ESR. 
D Properties of Θpηq
The profit-shifting term for an exporter selling a share η of its output abroad is given by:
Θpηq ” AHHAHF„
p1´ ηq σσ´1A
1
σ´1
HF ` η
σ
σ´1 τHFA
1
σ´1
HH
σ´1 , (D.1)
where is understood that both AHH and AHF are firm-specific demand shifters which depend on a
firm’s state vector ω.
It is straightforward to verify that Θp0q “ AHH and Θp1q “ τ1´σHF AHF .
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We now establish that Θ is maximized at a firm’s natural export intensity, ηdxH .
dΘ
dη
“ ´σpAHHAHF q
„
p1´ ηq σσ´1A
1
σ´1
HF ` η
σ
σ´1 τHFA
1
σ´1
HH
´σ
¨
ˆ
´p1´ ηq 1σ´1A
1
σ´1
HF ` τHF η
1
σ´1A
1
σ´1
HH
˙
“ 0,
(D.2)
Solving for η in (D.2) yields:
pηdxH q˚ “
τ1´σHF AHF
AHH ` τ1´σHF AHF
“ ηdxH . (D.3)
Substituting (D.3) into (D.1) verifies that ΘpηdxH q “ AHH ` τ1´σHF AHF . The second-order suffi-
cient condition reads:
d2Θ
dη2
“ ´ σ
σ ´ 1pAHHAHF q
#
σ
ˆ
τHF η
1
σ´1A
1
σ´1
HH ´ p1´ ηq
1
σ´1A
1
σ´1
HF
˙2
`
ˆ
τHF η
σ
σ´1A
1
σ´1
HH ` p1´ ηq
σ
σ´1A
1
σ´1
HF
˙
¨
ˆ
τHF η
2´σ
σ´1A
1
σ´1
HH ` p1´ ηq
2´σ
σ´1A
1
σ´1
HF
˙+
ă 0, (D.4)
which proves that Θ is a concave function of η, and therefore, that pηdxH q˚ is a global maximum. 
E Subsidies with ESR Granted only on Export Sales
In this case, the ad-valorem subsidy sr is only granted to a firm’s export sales. Thus, the problem
of a firm a vector of export subsidies psr, sf q with an export share requirement η P p0, 1s is
max
pηHH ,p
η
HF
#
AHHpωqppηHHq1´σ`p1`srqAHF pωqppηHF q1´σ´
ˆ
wH
ϕ
˙“
AHHpωqppηHHq´σ ` τHFAHF pωqppηHF q´σ
‰
´ p1´ sf qpfHH ` fHF qwH
+
subject to:
AHF pωqppηHF q1´σ
AHHpωqppηHHq1´σ `AHF pωqppηHF q1´σ
ě η.
(E.1)
Since Lemma 1 still holds, we know that the ESR constraint is binding, and can substi-
tute p1` srqAHF pωqppηHF q1´σ “ p1` srqrη{p1´ ηqsAHHpωqppηHHq1´σ and τHFAHF pωqppηHF q´σ “
τHFAHF pωqrηAHHpωq{p1´ ηqAHF pωqsσ{pσ´1qppηHHq´σ into the objective function in (E.1), so that
it becomes an unconstrained maximization problem with respect to one variable, pηHH :
max
pηHH
#ˆ
1` ηsr
1´ η
˙
AHHpωqppηHHq1´σ´
ˆ
wH
ϕ
˙«p1´ ηq σσ´1AHF pωq 1σ´1 ` τHF η σσ´1AHHpωq 1σ´1
p1´ ηq σσ´1AHF pωq 1σ´1
ff
AHHpωqppηHHq´σ
+
.
(E.2)
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Solving the first-order conditions associated with (E.2) for pηHH yields:
pηHHpωq “
«
p1´ ηq σσ´1AHF pωq 1σ´1 ` η σσ´1 τHFAHHpωq 1σ´1
p1´ ηq 1σ´1AHF pωq 1σ´1
ff
1
1` ηsr
σ
σ ´ 1
ˆ
wH
ϕ
˙
, (E.3)
and since pηHF “
´ p1´ηqAHF pωq
ηAHHpωq
¯ 1
σ´1
pηHH , we have:
pηHF pωq “
«
p1´ ηq σσ´1AHF pωq 1σ´1 ` η σσ´1 τHFAHHpωq 1σ´1
η
1
σ´1AHHpωq 1σ´1
ff
1
1` ηsr
σ
σ ´ 1
ˆ
wH
ϕ
˙
. (E.4)
Notice that since the terms in brackets in equations (E.3) and (E.4) are respectively greater
than 1 and lower than τHF when η P pηdxH , 1q, Proposition 1 still holds. Plugging (E.3) into (E.2)
results in optimal profits,
piηHpω; sr, sf , ηq “ κp1`ηsrqσΘpAHHpωq, AHF pωq, η, τq
ˆ
ϕ
wH
˙σ´1
´p1´sf qpfHH`fHF qwH , (E.5)
with ΘpAHHpωq, AHF pωq, η, τq defined in equation (10).
F Solution Algorithm
In this section we outline the algorithm used to solve the general equilibrium model presented in
Section 3. Recall that we have assumed in our benchmark that both countries are identical in
terms of preferences, endowments and the distributions of productivity and demand shifters and
the parameters governing these objects.
1. Approximate the distributions of firm-destination-specific demand shifters using the Gaussian
quadrature procedure described in Miranda and Fackler (2004). This produces grids Zii “
rzii,1, . . . , zii,Nz s and Zij “ rzij,1, . . . , zij,Nz s, as well as cumulative density functions Fzii and
Fzij , where i, j P tH,F u, such that domestic and export demand shifters are log-normally
distributed with underlying parameters pµd, σ2dq and pµx, σ2xq respectively.
2. For each possible combination of domestic and export demand shifters pzii, zijq, determine
the minimum productivity level necessary for a firm at Home to operate in each one of the
available modes of operation. At Home (the country utilizing subsidies with ESR) these are
summarized in Table 1; at Foreign, the modes of operation available are: domestic, regular
exporter and pure exporter. The minimum productivity necessary for a firm of type k in
country i to operate profitably is given by:
ϕi˚ pzii, zijq “ min
k
!
ϕ˚,ki
)
,
where ϕ˚,ki “ tϕ : piki pϕ; zii, zijq “ 0u.
3. For each ϕi˚ pzii, zijq, approximate the Pareto distribution of productivity conditional on sur-
vival, i.e. a Pareto distribution with shape parameter a and scale parameter ϕi˚ pzii, zijq, again
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using Gaussian quadrature. This produces a productivity grid Φi “ rϕ1, . . . , ϕNϕs and a cu-
mulative density function Fϕ. Construct a grid of size NϕˆN2z for firms’ state vector ωi, given
by the tensor product of the productivity and demand shifter grids, Ωi “ ΦibZiibZij . Since
productivity draws and demand shifters are independent from each other, the corresponding
cumulative density function for ω P Ωi is given by Fipωq “ Fϕ,ibFziibFzij . Notice that when
subsidies are in place, equilibrium will not be symmetrical and therefore the distribution of
productivity differs across countries.
4. For each element ω P Ωi, we solve firms’ problem, i.e. we determine the production mode
k that maximizes profits, and we record firms’ optimal prices tpkijpωqu, quantities tqkijpωqu,
sales revenue (net of subsidies) trkijpωqu, profits tpiki pωqu and labor demand tlki pωqu, in each
country i, j P tH,F u.
5. The general equilibrium pMH ,MF , PH , PF , EH , EF , wF q of this economy is found as the so-
lution to the following system of 7 non-linear equations:
• Labor market clearing:
Mi
„ÿ
k
ż
lki pωqdFipωq

“ Li, i P tH,F u (F.1)
• Free entry:
„ż ż
r1´ Fφ,ipϕ˚pzii, zijqqs dFziipziiqdFzij pzijq

¨
„ÿ
k
ż
piki pωqdFipωq

“ wife, i P tH,F u
(F.2)
• Aggregate income consistency:
Ei “ wiLi ´ Ti, i P tH,F u (F.3)
where,
TH “
ÿ
kPtdxu,dxc,xu,xcu
„
MH
"
sr
1` sr
ż
rrkHHpωq ` rkHF pωqs1kHpωqdFHpωq ` sf
ż
1kHpωqdFHpωq
*
,
and TF “ 0, and,
• Balanced trade:
MH
»–ż rdxHF pωqdFHpωq ` ÿ
kPtdxu,dxc,xu,xcu
1
1` sr
ż
rkHF pωq1kHpωqdFHpωq
fifl “
MF
„ÿ
kPtdx,xu
ż
rkFHpωqdFHpωq

, (F.4)
where 1ki pωq is the indicator function taking the value 1 when a firm in country i with
state vector ω uses operation mode k.
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G Calibrating the Model Using the Export Intensity Distribution
of China in 2013
In this section we present the model’s parameters (Table G.1) and the subsidy comparison results
(Table G.2) when the export intensity distribution of China in 2013 (drawn from the World Bank
Enterprise Surveys) is used to calibrate the natural export intensity distribution prevailing under
laissez-faire.
Table G.1: Parameter Values — China 2013 Export Intensity
Description Value
Assigned parameters:
Country size (L) 1
Elasticity of substitution (σ) 3
Shape parameter productivity distribution (a) 2.713
Scale parameter productivity distribution (ϕ) 1
Fixed cost — domestic sales (fd) 1
Transport cost (τ) 1.7
Calibrated parameters:
Fixed cost — entry (fe) 3.458
Fixed cost — exporting (fx) 0.719
Domestic demand shifters
`
lnpziiq „ N pµd, σ2dq
˘
(-0.685, 1.371)
Export demand shifters
`
lnpzijq „ N pµx, σ2xq
˘
(-1.538, 0.898)
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Table G.2: Comparison of Export Subsidies — China 2013 Export Intensity
Variable Subsidy with Export Unconditional Export
Share Requirements Subsidy
(1) (2)
% change w.r.t. laissez-faire
Wage, Foreign -4.484 -2.170
Price index, Home 1.403 -0.280
Price index, Foreign -5.477 -2.546
Probability of exit, Home -2.363 -0.626
Probability of exit, Foreign -0.912 -0.403
Welfare, Home -3.314 -0.383
Welfare, Foreign 1.044 0.107
Exports/GDP 9.550 2.701
percentage point change w.r.t. laissez-faire
Share of Home Exporters
with export intensity
P r0.7, 1q 9.800 -0.180
“ 1 9.100 0.410
Column (1) compares an 8.7% ad-valorem subsidy to export sales granted to firms with an export
intensity of at least 70% with the laissez-faire equilibrium. Column (2) compares a 5.35% ad-valorem
subsidy to export sales made available to all exporting firms regardless of their export intensity
with the laissez-faire equilibrium. Both subsidy schemes result in aggregate subsidy expenditure
accounting for 0.67% of Home’s GDP. Neither Home nor Foreign conducts any trade policy under
laissez-faire, but trade costs in both directions are maintained at their calibrated level (1.7) across
all scenarios.
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H Sensitivity Analysis
Table H.1: Sensitivity Analysis of Model Parameters
Variable 8.7% Export Sales Subsidy with ESR
Benchmark ∆ 10% from benchmark parametrization
σ fd fe Lf ϕF τ
% change w.r.t. laissez-faire
Wage, Foreign -2.18 -2.41 -2.22 -2.20 -2.31 -2.35 -1.85
Price index, Home 0.14 0.19 0.05 0.05 0.11 0.14 0.12
Price index, Foreign -2.42 -2.62 -2.47 -2.48 -2.54 -2.59 -2.00
Probability of exit, Home -6.54 -4.47 -7.25 -9.38 -7.73 -7.08 -4.42
Probability of exit, Foreign -1.15 -0.65 -1.14 -2.50 -1.14 -1.20 -0.34
Welfare, Home -0.83 -0.63 -0.64 -0.67 -0.67 -0.71 -0.33
Welfare, Foreign 0.41 0.19 0.33 0.41 0.25 0.25 0.03
Exports/GDP 6.32 6.29 5.33 6.28 5.32 5.31 3.10
percentage point change w.r.t. laissez-faire
Share of Home Exporters
with export intensity
P r0.7, 1q 4.30 3.80 3.50 4.10 3.40 3.70 2.70
“ 1 6.88 7.30 7.40 6.50 7.00 6.90 6.70
The table reports a comparison between the equilibrium value of a given variable when Home offers
an 8.7% ad-valorem subsidy to export sales to firms with an export intensity of at least 70% relative
to laissez-faire.
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